Detection of Aircraft Spoofing Using the GVA Parameter in ADS-B Data
Jakub TRÝB, Jakub HOSPODKA
Abstract. GNSS interference, including jamming and spoofing, represents a growing challenge to aviation safety. These disruptions critically impact systems reliant on accurate positional and altitude data, such as Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems (EGPWS). Spoofing, in particular, can cause severe anomalies in aircraft position and altitude data, leading to erroneous system responses. This paper investigates the potential application of the GVA (Geometric Vertical Accuracy) parameter, derived from ADS-B data, as a means of detecting GNSS interference, with a specific focus on its relevance for EGPWS functionality. More than 110 flights were analysed, comparing GVA parameter behaviour in regions with and without reported GNSS interference. Regions of suspected interference were identified using NOTAMs, reports, and algorithms from SkAI Data Services. The analysis focuses on the correlation between GVA anomalies and known GNSS disruption events, examining altitude discrepancies (GNSS versus barometric altitude) and positional anomalies (e.g., erratic movements, off-route positioning, and sudden location shifts). The methodology includes data preprocessing to isolate flights affected by interference, statistical analysis of GVA fluctuations, and graphical representation of observed trends. Flights from interference-free areas served as a baseline for comparison. The results indicate that GVA anomalies are consistently associated with regions of reported GNSS spoofing. Spoofing events manifest as significant discrepancies in aircraft position and GVA altitude. The discussion highlights the implications of these findings for operational safety. The study emphasizes the potential for integrating GVA-based detection methods, enabling these systems to act as supplementary indicators of GNSS interference. Limitations of the study, including a gap in critical coverage that partially limits the completeness of the analysis and the reliance on available ADS-B data, are acknowledged, along with suggestions for future research. This study demonstrates the feasibility of using ADS-B parameters, the GVA, as an indirect method for detecting GNSS interference. Future work will focus on expanding the dataset to include flights from additional regions, refining detection algorithms, and exploring the integration of these methods into operational aviation systems. By addressing GNSS interference at a system level, this research aims to contribute to the development of robust solutions that enhance aviation safety in an increasingly challenging navigation environment.
Keywords
GNSS Interference, ADS-B, GVA, Aircraft Navigation, Spoofing
Published online 7/20/2026, 7 pages
Copyright © 2026 by the author(s)
Published under license by Materials Research Forum LLC., Millersville PA, USA
Citation: Jakub TRÝB, Jakub HOSPODKA, Detection of Aircraft Spoofing Using the GVA Parameter in ADS-B Data, Materials Research Proceedings, Vol. 69, pp 2-8, 2026
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21741/9781644904251-1
The article was published as article 1 of the book CEAS – AIDAA Conference 2025
Content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 license. Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI.
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